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AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONNALLY RESERVATION

COLONEL WILLIAM E. LeGRO, USA

(Editor's Note: The views expressed in this
article are those o f the author and d o not
n e c e s s a r i l y reflect the views of the
Department of Defense or its agencies.)

(Should the Connally Reservation remain
as a limitation to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice insofar as
cases involving the United States are
concerned? Is there a reasonable
alternative that would provide the
protection now afforded by the
Reservation?)

THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT

On 1 August 1946, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported Senate
Resolution No. 196 to the Senate. The
resolution advised and consented to the
deposit by the President of the United States
with the Secretary General of the United
N a t i o n s of a d e c l a r a t i o n accepting
compulsory jurisdiction by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article 36 of the
Court's Statute.
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Senator Thomas T. Connally (1877- 1963),
author of the much-debated reservation to
Senate Resolution No. 196, 79th Congress.

I

There were two reservations in this
resolution. The second reservation was
modified in the Senate by the addition of
eight words: "as determined by the United
States of America." These eight words were
the Connally Amendment, and they appear in
the declaration filed by President Truman
with the Secretary General a month later.
They were added to the reservation in which
it is provided that the United States
recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court except that the declaration shall not
apply to "disputes with regard to matters
which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States."
The Senate Report discloses that the
Committee had considered and rejected the
self-judging clause. Considerably distilled,
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Senator Connally's oratory in support of his
short amendment laid emphasis on the fear
t h a t t h e C o u r t "might decide that
i m m i g r a t i o n was a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l
question . . . that tariffs were an international
q u e s t i o n . . . t h a t navigation was an
international question."
Although it is likely that the members
anticipated Senator Connally's move, the
Congressional Record gives the impression
that the amendment was a surprise. Senator
V a n d e n b e r g h a d already offered his
amendment (accepted and included as
paragraph (c) in the US Declaration); Senator
Donnell seemed to be setting the stage for
Senator Connally with questions about the
Court's competence to determine its own
j u r i s d i c t i o n ; a t this point, Connally
introduced his amendment without comment.
S e n a t o r Thomas (Utah) immediately
opposed the amendment, commenting, "The
Amendment . . . would be a contradiction of
compulsory jurisdiction itself." Apparently
the Senators in opposition t o the amendment,
led by Senators Morse and Thomas, had
concluded that the Senate would be unlikely
to give its consent to the Declaration unless
the Connally Amendment were included.
E n d i n g h i s l o n g , e r u d i t e , and
well-documented argument, Senator Morse
said, ". . . I hope we will adopt the resolution,
even with the amendment, if we cannot
defeat the amendment." Senator Pepper
continued his opposition to the amendment
on the grounds that it would contravene
Article 36 (6) of the Statute.
Nevertheless, the Connally Amendment
passed 51 to 12, with 3 3 not voting. Among
the 12 opposed were Fulbright, Morse,
Pepper, and Thomas (Utah). The following
day, the Senate passed the resolution 60 to 2,
with 34 not voting.
T h e s u p p o r t e r s of the self-judging
reservation ignored or failed to understand
the Court's statutory competency and the
criteria it used for the determination of
" domestic m a t t e r s . " They appeared
unconvinced that the Court could not, out of
hand and in the abstract, declare immigration,
tariffs, or navigation to be "international
matters." The Court's determination of
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jurisdiction must be made on the basis of
whether the matter involves international
obligations arising out of general international
law, or out of international agreements. Such
a decision must be made in connection with a
concrete dispute before the Court.
The United States has concluded many
agreements in all of these subject areas; it
would be to the advantage of the United
States, not to its peril, to be in a position to
have disputes involving these agreements
adjudicated by the ICJ. It might be possible
that even the most conservative of our
lawmakers could be convinced of this if they
were offered concrete assurance that no state
(nor the UN) could bring the United States to
account before the ICJ on matters involving
the political, social, or economic rights of
United States citizens. The purpose here is to
propose how that assurance might be
provided.
Opposition to the Connally Amendment
continued after its passage by the Senate. In
fact, it continues to this day. Among the early
leaders in the campaign to eliminate the
self-judging clause were the American Bar
Association and the American Society of
International Law. Official expression was
given these efforts when, on 24 March 1959,
Senator Humphrey submitted his resolution
to repeal the amendment (S. Res. 94).
Humphrey was joined in sponsorship by
Senator Icefauver in June.
H e a r i n g s were held on the
Humphrey-Kefauver resolution in January
a n d February 1960. The amendment
proposed by Senator Humphrey was simply a
restatement of the Declaration without the
words "as determined by the United States of
America," but including the Vandenberg
Amendment pertaining to "disputes arising
under a multilateral treaty ."
The Committee took over 500 pages of
testimony and statements, but the resolution
has never been reported back to the Senate.
Among the individuals and organizations
furnishing testimony and statements in favor
of the Humphrey-Kefauver Resolution were
President Eisenhower; Vice President Nixon;
Senators Javits, Humphrey, and Keating;
Professors Quincy Wright, Louis Sohn, Philip

C. Jessup, and Herbert W. Briggs; the State
Department; the Justice Department; the
American Society of International Law; the
American Bar Association; the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York; the Board
of World Peace of the Methodist Church; and
the United World Federalists.
T h e f a m i l i a r sensitive
subjects-immigration, tariffs, and the Panama
Canal-appeared prominently as the major
rallying points for those opposed to the
resolution. The less informed of these
witnesses raised the possibility of Court
interference in the Guantanamo Naval Base,
national security, naturalization, interstate
commerce, domestic criminal jurisdiction,
rights of private property, foreign aid, and the
federal structure of the Union. Among those
heard in opposition were the National
Economic Council, New York City; the
Daughters of the American Revolution; the
Veterans of Foreign Wars; ex-Senator
Connally (by letter); the Virginia Commission
on Constitutional Delegates; Robert J. Kelley,
speaking for the State Bar of Texas (which
also favors US withdrawal from the UN); and
the Southern States Industrial Council (which
also favors US withdrawal from the UN).
Questioning Professor Briggs, Senator
Lausche disclosed his own perturbation
caused by United Nations civil rights
declarations:
If you concede that the Court has a right
to explore international law as it is
recorded and to consider what the United
Nations declared to be the natural right
to travel, and you recognize that the
International Court would have the
power to redeclare the international law
on immigration-would it not be well to
insert here that it shall take jurisdiction in
all disputes hereafter arising concerning
any question of existing international
law?l
The record does not show whether
Professor Briggs was successful in convincing
the Senator that the Court could not legislate,
and that UN declarations are not law.
Human rights and the Court's jurisdiction

were joined in collective abhorrence by the
Southern States Industrial Council:
It [the Council] commends the Senate
for its refusal to ratify the UN-sponsored
Genocide Convention and calls upon it to
take similar action when and if the
UN-sponsored declaration of human
rights and proposals to expand the
jurisdiction of the World Court to include
domestic affairs are submitted.2
The Daughters of the American Revolution
expressed concern in similar terms, warning
that if the United States gives the Court
compulsory jurisdiction, and subscribes t o the
Covenant of Human Rights, Americans would
lose their guarantee to ownership of private
property and could be tried by the Court
under provisions of the Genocide Convention.
It is impossible to assess the seriousness
with which those Senators who favor
retention of the Connally Amendment regard
the impact of the UN Human Rights
Declaration and the Covenant. Continued
resistance to all efforts to remove the
C o n n a l l y A m e n d m e n t from the US
Declaration indicates, however, that this
resistance is still based on these grounds. If
the assault on the Connally Amendment is to
be successful in the near future, these
Senators must be convinced that the Court
will not make the individual a subject of
international law in his own country. Before
describing how this might be done, we should
examine in some detail the matter of
jurisdiction as it applies to the ICJ.
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE

In examining questions of jurisdiction and
competence as they relate to international
courts, it is necessary to eliminate from
consideration the familiar concepts and rules
that apply to municipal court jurisdiction.
For instance, in domestic legal systems, the
hierarchy of courts provides a chamber
competent for every subject and every object
of justiciable dispute. The jurisdiction of the
m e m b e r - c h a m b e r s may be based on
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geographic considerations, on subject matter,
on the point reached in the progress of
appeals, or on other considerations. But
regardless of the structure of the system, its
jurisdiction is complete, organized, and
temporally unlimited. These concepts do not
apply to the international courts.
There is a seemingly random multiplicity of
international arbitral and judicial bodies.
Although there is no hierarchy of courts, the
ICJ is preeminent. It occupies this position
because of its identity as a principal organ of
the United Nations (Art. 1, Stat. of the ICJ).
There is no court superior t o the ICJ, and the
Court is responsible to no other UN body.
But these facts in themselves do not
determine the competence or extend the
jurisdiction of the Court. The ICJ is not, in a
jurisdictional sense, a Supreme Court, and the
states are free to select any court o r means of
arbitration that suits their interests (Art. 95,
UN Charter).
The jurisdiction of the ICJ-that is to say,
its capacity to decide a dispute with binding
authority-is unlimited in the first instance by
the Statute of the Court which declares that
the "jurisdiction of the Court comprises all
cases which the parties refer t o it . . . ." [Art.
36 ( I ) ] . This broad jurisdiction becomes
limited by Articles 34 and 35 which deal with
access to the Court:
Article 34: Only states may be parties in
cases before the Court . . . .
Article 35: The Court shall be open to all
states parties to the present Statute.
The Articles, taken in conjunction with
Chapter IV-Advisory Opinions-deny t o the
United Nations Organization access to the
Court in any case other than in advisory
opinions. (This denial is eluded through the
provision in treaties, to which an international
organization is party, of statements that place
a r b i t r a l a u t h o r i t y concerning treaty
interpretation in the Court.) Furthermore,
Article 35 implies the consensual nature of
the Court's competence in that while it is
"open to the states," it cannot force its
jurisdiction upon them. In the Peace Treaties
case, the Court said that the basis of the
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Court's jurisdiction was in the consent of the
states, parties to a dispute.
Article 36 provides additional definition of
the Court's jurisdiction. This Article permits
the states to file with the Registrar of the
Court (through the Secretary General of the
UN) declarations accepting compulsory ipso
facto jurisdiction of the Court in relation to
another state accepting the same obligation.
The Court has held that the Court's
jurisdiction is only as broad, in a particular
case, as the reservations of the most narrowly
limiting party. That is to say that if State A,
having accepted the Court's unlimited
jurisdiction, is sued by State B, which has not
filed a declaration or has narrowly limited the
Court's jurisdiction, State A is entitled as a
right of reciprocity to invoke the same
reservations in this dispute as State B. Thus,
states that have declined to file declarations
under Article 36 cannot secure decisions on
merits from the Court in suits against states
that have so filed if the respondent states
choose to stand on rights of reciprocity.
Similarly, s t a t e s that have included
reservations in their declarations can expect
these reservations to be turned against them.
This happened with significant effect in the
Case of Certain Norwegian Loans in which
Norway was successful in preventing a
decision on merits by invoking reciprocally
France's reservation under which France
reserved the right t o judge when a dispute was
within the domestic jurisdiction of France.
France later eliminated this reservation from
its declaration.
Judge McNair, in his individual opinion in
t h e Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case,
described s u c c i n c t l y the system of
compulsory jurisdiction:
Under the Covenant of the League of
Nations and the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice no State
was under any obligation to accept the
Jurisdiction of that Court. However,
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
afforded to States an opportunity of
doing so by means of a voluntary act.
That paragraph (which is reproduced in
the Statute of the present Court in terms

whlch are identical in all material
respects) was in the nature of a standing
invitation made on behalf of the Court to
Members of the League of Nations to
accept as compulsory, on the basis of
reciprocity, the whole or any part of the
jurisdiction of the Court a s therein
defined. It should be noted that the
machinery provided by that paragraph is
that of 'contracting in,' not 'contracting
out.' A State, being free either to make a
Declaration or not, is entitled, if it
decides to make one, to lhnit the scope of
its Declaration in any way it chooses,
subject always to reciprocity. Another
State seeking to found the jurisdiction of
the Court upon it must show that the
Declaration of both States concur in
comprising the dispute in question within
their scope. 1952 at p. 116.3
Whereas states are free t o declare o r n o t t o
declare, or t o limit their reservations by any
terms they so desire, the Court is competent
to determine its own jurisdiction in each case.
"The admissibility or validity of any specific
reservation is a matter to be decided in each
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . "4 An international court's
ability to determine its own jurisdiction is a
fundamental principle of international law
that has never been challenged.
The Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae
exercised under Article 36 is limited to:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach
of international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of a n
international obligation.5
Finally, the Court's jurisdiction is limited
by Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter:
Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to

United Nalionr

Home of the International Court of Justice is the
Peace Palace at The Hague, Netherlands.
submit such matters to settlement under
the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
As an integral organ of the United Nations,
the Court is bound by this as well as by all the
articles of the Charter. In this sense, the
Charter is the Constitution under which the
Court functions; the Statute o f the Court
cannot derogate any provision of the Charter.
The controversy between those who favor
full US participation in the Court and those
w h o w o u l d p e r p e t u a t e the Connally
Amendment revolves around the issue of
"domestic jurisdiction."
The matter of domestic jurisdiction has
become clouded as a result of the War Crimes
Trials in Numberg and Tokyo, by attempts to
codify the rules upon which these trials were
based, and by General Assembly resolutions
and covenants such as the Declaration of
Human Rights that clearly enter into regions
of traditionally domestic jurisdiction. The
Charter does not define "intervention" or
"domestic jurisdiction," b u t these UN
e x c u r s i o n s into areas commonly held
sovereign by the states, while they are not
accepted as law, have led some politicians and
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others to be wary of any consent to
jurisdiction by the ICJ.
These people are not comforted by the fact
that the ICJ has held that the extent or
absence of jurisdiction is determined not by
subject matter or national interest, but rather
by the obligations that the state has, as
disclosed by the facts of the dispute, under
general international law and particular
international law (treaties). Neither have their
fears been assuaged by the fact that the
declaring nation retains the right to withdraw
i t s declaration (the United States on
six-months' notice), nor by the political
reality of the Court's inability t o compel
compliance with its decision. Nevertheless,
the Court looks upon "domestic jurisdiction"
as "the residuum of sovereignty remaining
outside a state's international obligations."6
The misunderstandings and suspicions of
those who fear the Court's intrusion into
domestic affairs have been given substance in
self-judging reservations t o compulsory
jurisdiction declarations, even though seven
judges of the ICJ have declared that such
reservations are invalid as being in
contravention of Article 36 (6) of the Statute
under which the Court is competent to
determine, with finality, its own jurisdiction.7
Summarizing the facts of the Court's
jurisdiction, it is limited by the independent
and collective will of the states to confer
upon it a power to exercise jurisdiction. This
jurisdiction is conferred neither by tacit
consent nor by the mere fact of ratification
by the state of the UN Charter and the
Statute of the Court. The state's consent to
jurisdiction depends upon explicit statements
to that effect in particular treaties, or in
general declarations filed in consonance with
Article 36 of the Statute. In other forms,
consent t o the Court's jurisdiction may be
restricted by agreement between parties to a
dispute to narrow questions of fact or to
narrowly defined issues; states may even
confer appellate jurisdiction upon the Court
by means of agreement. As Rosenne puts it:

decide a case, with binding force on the
parties, whenever two or more States,
parties to the Statute or having accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court are, or may
be inferred to be, in agreement that the
concrete case is to be decided by the
Court.8

But regardless of the limits to jurisdiction
stipulated by the states, the competence of
the Court to determine whether a dispute lies
within or beyond those stipulated limits
seems indisputable, self-judging reservations
notwithstanding. The Court's recognition of
the United States self-judging reservation has
yet to be tested, although the United States
invoked its Connally Amendment in one of its
o b j e c t i o n s in t h e Interhandel case.
Unfortunately for the development of the
Court's position of this issue, the Court ruled
instead in favor of another of the United
States objections-that Interhandel had not
exhausted local remedies in US courts.9
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASE

The ICJ's 1966 decision against Liberia and
Ethiopia in the South West Africa case has
seriously discredited the Court in the eyes of
many American and European observers, as
well as in the eyes of the new states of Africa.
The Court is probably at the nadir of its long
and useful history. It would seem that now
would be a most propitious time to
demonstrate the interest and confidence that
the United States has in the ICJ. The removal
of the Connally Amendment from the US
declaration would be a dramatic and
influential means of accomplishing this end.
The decision in the South West Africa case
provides an excellent clue to how an
alternative to the Connally Amendment might
be framed. A brief review of this case will
illustrate this point.
In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia brought
proceedings against South Africa in the ICJ,
contending that South Africa had violated the
conditions of its mandate with regard to
South West Africa. These proceedings were
based on Article 7 of the Mandate that
created an obligation, with respect to South

The conclusion may, therefore, be
reached, that the Court will be
competent, or will have jurisdiction, to
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Africa, to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in
the event of a dispute between members of
the League of Nations and the Mandatory
that conld not be settled by negotiation.
Three times, prior to this suit, in advisory
opinions, the ICJ has asserted that the United
Nations was the successor to the League of
Nations and had inherited all rights and duties
under the existing mandates.10
In 1962, the Court ruled that the ICJ had
jurisdiction to decide the case on merits.
Then, in 1966, the Court shocked much of
the international legal community by ruling
that Ethiopia and Liberia, although former
members of the League of Nations, had
insufficient legal interest in the enforcement
of the mandate for the benefit of the
inhabitants of South West Africa to obtain
judicial satisfaction. In other words, the Court
said that Liberia and Ethiopia would have to
show some special, national interest before
they were entitled to get a judgment. The
court concluded, by a vote of 8 to 7, that the
litigants had shown no such interest. Here lies
the clue to an alternative to the Connally
Amendment.
AN ALTERNATIVE

An alternative to repeal of the Connally
Amendment was advanced by the Maryland
State Bar Association in 1961. 11 This
recommendation would exclude from the
Court's jurisdiction a list of "domestic"
matters:
. . . tariffs, immigration, atomic energy,
offshore rights, and other such matters as
have traditionally been considered within
o u r domestic jurisdiction . . . and. . .
disputes arising out of such matters as
war, international hostilities and military
o c c u p a t i o n , our rights in canals,
waterways, military, naval and air bases,
and any other matter affecting the
defense of the United States or its
national security.

What is left for the Court's jurisdiction?
What of all of the agreements the United
S t a t e s h a s c o n c l u d e d i n these

matters-agreements that contain provisions
for the Court's jurisdiction, or for the Court's
appointment of arbitrators? l2 Such an
enumeration of excluded matters would be
more crippling and irrational than the
Connally reservation as it now stands.
It would be as easy to find a Castro-lover in
the John Birch Society as it would be to find
a Connally Amendment supporter in the
American Society of International Law. Yet,
for all the erudition and depth of legal
experience in the latter organization, few if
any of its writers have advocated anything
other than complete elimination of the
self-judging element of the domestic
jurisdiction reservation. This all-or-nothing
approach, while easily supportable on logical,
legalistic grounds, is not designed to appeal to
the minority of Senators who hold the power
to control just enough in excess of one-third
of the voting strength in the Senate to block
an outright attack on the Amendment.13 But
t h e s e Senators have demonstrated, on
occasion, a willingness to go part way, to
compromise. Furthermore, most of these
Senators are lawyers who would understand
and might appreciate a well constructed,
oblique approach-a provision that will
produce the desired result without appearing
too obvious and arbitrary in doing so.
This is the sort of alternative proposed for
the Connally reservation; an alternative that
will provide the desired safeguard against
foreign intrusion in domestic affairs-most
particularly in the area of civil rights-yet will
be nothing more than a sound legal maxim. It
will be, in fact, a restatement of an ancient
rule of American (and English) common law.
Moreover, the rule will be in harmony with
the Statute of ICJ and with general and
particular international law. Furthermore, this
rule is suggested by the recent decision in the
South West Africa case.
The rule of law that provides the
foundation of this proposed alternative is that
". . . a
tort committed upon one person
furnishes no cause of action in favor of
another." (52 Am. Jur., Torts: 95).
Furthermore, "As a general rule, one having
no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as a party
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state. A foreign government could show n o
remedial interest in a claim on behalf of any
American, nor could it show a substantial
right or interest. Neither could it demonstrate
that it would be benefited b y the relief
granted. I t is a clear principle of international
law that a state has n o justiciable interest in
the civil rights of the citizens of another state
either b y its own right or in a representative
capacity.
Who could bring suit in the ICJ on behalf
of American citizens residing in the United
States? The United Nations? No. The United
Nations is not a state and only states may be
parties before the Court in contentious
disputes (Art. 34, Statute of the Court). The
answer is that n o legal entity exists that
would have the capacity t o call the US t o
account in the ICJ on behalf of any citizen o r
group of citizens of the United States.
How should the provision be constructed in
the US Declaration? Certainly the clause
should be framed by a committee of
competent lawyers, but the following might
be a working draft for such a committee:

plaintiff in an action." (39 A m . Jur., Parties:
9). In another authority the mle is stated:
". . . the courts have recognized that a
plaintiff must have a legal entity, the legal
capacity t o sue, and a remedial interest in the
cause of action asserted." (67 CJS, Parties: 3).
This principle is developed even more fully i n
Corpus Juris as follows:
. . .in order to be a party plaintiff in an
action, he must ordinarily have some real,
direct, present, and substantial right or
interest in the subject matter of the
c o n t r o v e r s y . . . as a rule, the
interest . . . should be such that he will be
benefited by the relief granted
therein. . . . Moreover, it has been held to
be a rule of universal acceptation that in
order to entitle any person to maintain an
action in court it must be shown that he
has a justiciable interest in the subject
matter in litigation; either by his own
right or in a representative capacity. (67
CJS, Parties: 6).

Again, in American Jurisprudence, the rule
appears thus:

(1) Delete the words 'as determined by

the United States of America.'

[As a] fundamental principle . . . courts
are instituted to afford relief to persons
whose rights have been invaded, or are
threatened with invasion, by the
defendant's acts or conduct, and to give
relief at the instance of such persons; a
court may and properly should refuse to
entertain an action at the instance of one
whose rights have not been invaded or
infringed, as where he seeks to invoke a
remedy in behalf of another who seeks no
redress. (39 Am. Jur., Parties: M).

(2) Add, in clause (c) after the words
' . . . specially agrees to jurisdiction;

and'-and before the clause relating to the
period of force of the declaration-the
following:
(3) 'Provided

further that this
declaration shall apply only to legal
disputes arising out of matters in which
the complaining party, that is to say, the
plaintiff, can show a real, direct, present,
and substantial right or interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, and
that such right or interest is such that the
plaintiff will be benefited by the relief
asked.'

How would reliance on this rule, in lieu of
the Connally Amendment, prevent the ICJ
from exercising jurisdiction in domestic
American disputes? A suit by a foreign
government on behalf of any US citizen or
group of citizens would be impossible because
of the action of this rule in conjunction with
t h e universally accepted principle of
international law that a state has n o
protective interest in the citizens of another

This reservation contravenes n o generally
accepted rule of international law. It does
nothing t o the obligations which states may
assume in collective security agreements or
under any other treaty o r convention.
36

F u r t h e r m o r e , the elimination of the
s e l f - j u d g i n g portion o f the Connally
Amendment would relieve the present
conflict with the Statutory provision [Article
36, (6)] that gives the Court competence in
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l disputes. This alternative
reservation would in n o way contravene or
derogate the competence of t h e Court. I t
would place the United States in the company
o f other nations that have taken seriously
their international obligations, having placed
their confidence in the ability o f the ICJ t o
settle impartially, within the body o f
accepted rules o f law, justiciable disputes.
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